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Abstract— Hadoop implements its own file system HDFS
(Hadoop Distributed File System) designed to run on commodity
hardware to store and process large data sets. Data Spillage is a
condition where a data set of higher classification is accidentally
stored on a system of lower classification. When deleted, the spilled
data remains forensically retrievable due to the fact that file
systems implement deletion by merely resetting pointers and
marking corresponding space as available. The problem is
augmented in Hadoop as it is designed to create and store multiple
copies of same data to ensure high availability, thereby increasing
risk to confidentiality of data. This paper proposes three
approaches to eliminate such risk. In the first approach, the spilled
data is securely overwritten with zero and random fills multiple
times at the OS level, to render it forensically irretrievable. In the
second approach, the Hadoop inbuilt delete function is enhanced
to implement a secure deletion mechanism. In the third approach,
the hard drives of the data nodes which have spilled data is
replaced with new ones after destroying the old drives. This paper
also evaluates all 3 approaches to arrive at an optimal solution
which is implementable in a large scale production environment.

to different Hadoop clusters. A situation may arise where the
employee accidentally places a classified piece of data on the
cluster meant for unclassified data. This situation is called data
spillage and threatens the confidentiality of the classified data.
Hadoop further augments the situation by replicating the data
across multiple data nodes, since it is designed to do so. The
spilled data is generally referred to as “dirty data” and the data
nodes on which the dirty data resides are referred to as “dirty
nodes”.

Keywords— Hadoop, HDFS, Data Forensics, Data Spillage,
Secure Data Deletion

I. INTRODUCTION
Hadoop is an open source framework designed for
distributed storage and processing of very large data sets,
ensuring high availability. Hadoop implements its own file
system HDFS (Hadoop Distributed File System) on commodity
hardware. It has two main components, Name Node and Data
Node, which operate in a cluster architecture as a single unit. A
cluster generally is made up of one Name node and multiple
Data nodes. Data node, as the name suggests, stores the actual
data sets. Name node also known as “Master” node, stores meta
data of the data stored on the data nodes. Name node also
decides the distribution of data sets across different data nodes
in a cluster. When a file is input to the Hadoop cluster, the name
node breaks it into blocks of configured size, replicates them (as
per the configured Replication Factor) across multiple data
nodes in the cluster to ensure distributed and highly available
storage. A representation of the working is shown in Fig. 1.
Many organizations today leverage on products built with
Hadoop as their underlying storage architecture, to tackle the
ever growing problem of storing and processing large
organizational and customer data. Many government agencies
also use Hadoop and generally have an architecture where
different clusters are maintained for different classifications of
data. An employee of such an agency can have access clearance
to different classifications of data and consequently has access
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Fig. 1. Hadoop Cluster Representation

In response to such a situation the employee may delete the
data from the unclassified cluster and feel safe about it.
However, it is a proven fact that deletion of data on current file
systems including HDFS merely removes the pointers to the data
blocks and marks the corresponding disk space as available. The
actual data bits on the disk remain unchanged unless
overwritten. When the dirty nodes or their disk backups are
subjected to forensic analysis the deleted data is recoverable.
Hence the threat to confidentiality of data still remains.
In case of government agencies, unclassified systems do not
have as secure a backup strategy as classified systems and the
backups are generally accessible to administrators who are not
authorized to access classified data. Deleted data is recoverable
from such backups causing leakage of classified information.
Leakage of classified government information implies a direct
threat to national security. Therefore, the problem of handling
data spillage situations qualifies for an in-depth research with a
goal to develop secure incident response tools and strategies
which eliminate threats to confidentiality of spilled data.
This research report evaluates three approaches to achieve
this goal, and arrive at the most optimal and feasible solution. It
further enhances the solution into an implementable
tool/procedure which can be integrated into an existing incident

management process of a large scale production system. The
three approaches are:
1) OS Level Secure Deletion: This approach is focused on
developing a standalone tool that will overwrite desired data
blocks with zero and/or random fills multiple times at the
OS level before the file is actually deleted in Hadoop. This
renders the data irretrievable via forensic techniques, thus
achieving the goal. This approach can be integrated into any
existing Hadoop environment as no configuration changes
are required in Hadoop itself.
2) Enhance Hadoop Binaries: This approach aims to enhance
Hadoop’s built-in delete function to perform secure deletion
instead of mere pointer deletion. It essentially puts a data
overwrite feature in Hadoop’s deletion code flow such that
the data is first overwritten with zero and/or random fills
and then the file pointers are deleted. This ensures that each
data block is overwritten before it is actually deleted hence
it renders the data irretrievable via forensic analysis. It is to
be noted that this approach would be Hadoop specific and
would work seamlessly since the functionality is built right
into Hadoop.
3) Node Removal: In this approach, the dirty data is deleted
from the data nodes in the normal manner. This would leave
data remnants. The dirty nodes are then taken offline one by
one so as to allow Hadoop to replicate the good data across
other nodes. Then the hard drives of the dirty nodes are
replaced with fresh ones and the dirty drives are securely
destroyed. It is to be noted that this approach surely
addresses the problem but is also cost intensive.
Section IV of this report discusses the above approaches in
detail and describes the tasks accomplished in individual
direction. Section V of this report discusses in detail the various
tests carried out for each approach and the results obtained. The
tests are performed on a test bed consisting of 1 Name node and
7 Data nodes using Hadoop 2.7.3 running on Ubuntu 14.04.5.
The outcome of the research provides a viable solution to
organizations suffering from data spillage issues and also
strengthens the security of distributed data storage systems like
Hadoop. In case of government organizations, it is definitely a
step towards ensuring confidentiality of classified information
and thus avoiding any threat to national security arising from
data spillage.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Literature review was done targeting the specific needs of
the project. As this project revolves around Hadoop
Infrastructure, relevant literature was reviewed to understand the
architecture of Hadoop distributed file system [1]. The review
also assisted in understanding the various components involved
in Hadoop DFS and their significance. It gave the starting point
to the team to develop different approaches to tackle the problem
statement. It also assisted in designing approach 2, as it is based
on modifying existing Hadoop binaries to integrate the secure
deletion process.
As proposed by Alabi, Oluwatosin et.al [2], data remnants
can be recovered even after the data deletion from Hadoop
cluster, by using Forensic tools. Deleted data is not securely

wiped from the distributed file system, but only the pointers to
data are removed. Disk space that is occupied by the data blocks
are marked as free space and remains in unallocated sectors on
the disk. This research forms the base for the project. Extending
the work done by [2], proposed research will aim to develop
procedure for wiping out data remnants from unallocated sectors
by overwriting with random data or zero bits, thereby making it
harder to recover it using forensic tools.
Hadoop distributed file system is based on virtual file
system, so the forensic procedures that needs to be followed on
Hadoop system varies from the standard data forensic
procedures as mentioned by Cho, ChaeHo et. al [3]. This
approach is crucial in implementing secure deletion for spilled
data to verify the effectiveness of secure deletion solution, as it
provides visibility on remnants of the deleted data blocks.
Proposed research takes input from this paper and implements
procedures to verify the working and efficiency of developed
approaches.
Secure deletion of data can be achieved by overwriting the
data blocks with random data or zero bits. This procedure has to
be applied multiple times in order to ensure the data remnants
cannot be recovered by forensic tools, as suggested by Gutmann,
Peter [4]. This research will incorporate the similar process that
will overwrite the data blocks with random data bits but at the
same time make it optimal for Hadoop environment and
ensuring secure erasure of data remnants.
Agrawal, Bikash et. al [5] in their work suggests an approach
on how we can go about implementing secure deletion process
in Hadoop environment. In their approach, they have developed
a new component “Checker Node” to track the data remnants,
securely delete the blocks that contain data. Although there is no
practical implementation of such process. Our proposed
research project extends the work done so far on implementing
secure deletion in Hadoop. The project aims to implement three
approaches to tackle data spillage issue.
Approach 2 deals with modifying the Hadoop binaries by
modifying the existing delete function to incorporate secure
deletion process. [6] gives the direction for this approach to look
for relevant commands for data deletion and modify their
behavior in the source code. Approach 1 which deals with
implementing secure deletion on OS level itself is inspired by
[6] and [5], it states the optimum requirement for secure deletion
of that on Linux environment and how to integrate secure
deletion in HDFS
From the previous work and the references listed above, it is
clear that data deletion process in Hadoop is unsecure and
process needs to be developed for secure deletion of data
remnants. Through proposed project we will device an
automated procedure for secure deletion using random data
overwrite on data blocks.
III.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Data spillage of highly classified information poses a great
threat to it confidentiality if the adversary is able to retrieve it.
The challenge this creates is that simply deleting the spilled data
is not adequate as the data remnants still remain on file system.
Only pointers to the file are removed and that particular file
sector is marked as free space. The legacy file system can later

on use this space to write new files, in this case the spilled data
that was deleted is overwritten by new data and the remnants of
spilled data is completely destroyed. But this legacy system's
approach is highly unreliable.
This issue persists in Hadoop infrastructure hosted on these
legacy systems. Hadoop uses similar delete function to remove
any files in its File system i.e. only removing pointers. This
problem magnifies more on Hadoop's clustered environment as
by design Hadoop is designed with high availability of data. So
it replicates every data copy and store on multiple Data Nodes.
Therefore, in Data Spillage scenario, the data is present on
multiple Data Nodes. This demands for a centralized and
automated approach to securely wipe the data from every Data
Node.
Many researches have been done in this field on traditional
file systems but an implementable solution on cluster file
systems is yet to be seen. This research project aims to identify
an optimal approach out of three suggested approaches, and
develop it into a full-fledged solution which will be integrated
into the incident response management process of a large scale
production system.

1) Queries HDFS to extract details of each data block
corresponding to the file in consideration.
2) Accepts from the user the number of times to overwrite and
the pattern to be used to overwrite i.e. overwrite by zero bits
or random bits.
3) Connects to each data node on which the data blocks are
located and overwrites them multiple times with random or
zero bits. The tool leverages Linux utilities such as "dd" to
perform the overwrite function.
Once the data overwriting process is completed,
administrator can delete the file normally using Hadoop
command. This ensures the contents of the file are securely
deleted before the file pointers are removed, thus achieving the
purpose.
The tool is structured in way that it can be readily integrated
with any existing Hadoop Cluster environment. No
configuration changes are required in existing infrastructure for
this tool to work. This approach integrates into the Containment,
Eradication and Recovery stage of the Incident Response
Process as shown in Fig. 2.

For the purposes of this research it is assumed that data of
different classifications are stored on different Hadoop clusters.
Data spillage situation is considered a given i.e. detection of data
spillage situation is beyond the scope of this research.
IV.

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

This project aims to eliminate threat to confidentiality of
spilled data by eliminating the possibility of data recovery from
a spillage situation. This project explores and evaluates 3
approaches to arrive at an optimal one to achieve secure data
deletion on Hadoop clusters. It also suggests how each of the
approaches can be integrated into an existing incident response
procedure. The approaches are as described below:
A. OS Level Secure Deletion
To tackle this issue of deleted data recovery, one could
overwrite the entire free space of the file system to make sure
data remnants are completely wiped. However, this process
freezes the entire file system and hence cannot be extended to
Hadoop's Cluster environment due to large number of data
nodes and high volumes of disk space.
To overcome this problem, in the OS Level Secure Deletion
approach, a standalone tool has been developed which has the
capability to overwrite any file that is present on the Hadoop file
system, as desired by an administrator. Once data spillage is
detected, an administrator can use this tool to overwrite all the
blocks of the corresponding file and then delete the file using
normal delete command in Hadoop. This makes the target for
data overwriting smaller as compared to entire free space and
can be easily integrated in any existing Hadoop Cluster
environment. The tool is to be deployed on the Name Node, so
it can centrally manage the overwrite process. In case of a cluster
with multiple name nodes, the tool is capable of operating from
one single name node to address the needs of the entire cluster.
It requires the name of the file to be deleted as input. It then
performs the below steps:

Fig. 2. File representation in Hex before deletion [7]

Detailed working of the tool and the steps involved in
testing is described in section 5 of this report.
B. Enhancement of Hadoop Binaries
This approach involves enhancement of Hadoop binaries to
implement a secure deletion function. This function overwrites
memory blocks of the file holding classified data with multiple
runs of zero and random fills, before deleting the pointers to the
data blocks. To achieve this, an in-depth analysis of Hadoop
Distributed File System and Unix File System was carried out,
along with analysis of the code flows of deletion operation in
Hadoop. The exact location in Hadoop’s java code base where
the delete function is implemented is located, the function is
modified to incorporate a data block overwrite feature and a
patch is created which can be used to implement secure deletion
functionality on any implementation of Hadoop 2.7.3.
HDFS interface follows Unix filesystem pattern with some
variations in standards in order to accommodate improved
performance for the applications [1]. HDFS can be accessed
from applications in many ways. It provides native Java API’s
which are used by applications and a native C-language wrapper
for the API’s [8]. FS shell is the command line interface that lets
any user interact with data placed in Hadoop.
In Unix filesystem, file records are stored in mainly two parts
of the disk – inodes and data blocks. Data blocks contain the

actual contents of the file whereas metadata about the files are
stored in inodes which include hard-links, soft-links, UID, GID,
File mode, etc. [9] The system uses hard-links to point to the
data blocks. Hadoop uses the hard-links concept as well. When
a user passes a Hadoop fs command in order to remove a file,
the data node removes the hard links pointing to the block and
the system marks the inode belonging to that file as unused and
the memory location where the data resides is added to the list
of unallocated free space.
Fig. 3 shows the normal deletion process implemented in
Hadoop. Here the cross sign indicates the pointer to data blocks
being removed. Any user will be able to access the data
forensically, as long as the area where the data block resided has
not been overwritten.

A patch has been created which consists of the modified
Hadoop jar file (hadoop-common-2.7.0.jar) and a custom bash
script to carry out the secure deletion. When any user tries to
delete a file or directory in Hadoop, the control goes over to
Hadoop’s internal deletion function wherein a custom stub is
placed which calls an external script. This script carries out the
following operations:
1) Detect the nodes on which original data blocks as well as all
the replicated blocks of the file has been placed.
2) Connect to each node and send “dd” command to securely
overwrite the data contents with random values (user can
specify whether to overwrite the data with 0’s or with
random values as well as the number of times to overwrite
it with).
3) Once data has been overwritten, control is passed to
Hadoop’s internal delete function which removes the
pointer to the data blocks hence completing the final stage
in the secure deletion process.
Details such as number of blocks created for the file, address
of data nodes where blocks are present, block names, block size
in bytes, timestamp when the “dd” command was executed is
also generated by the custom script and this data is logged to
keep track of the data blocks which have been deleted securely.
This data can be used for audit trail or incident response as well.
Fig. 5. lays out the secure deletion process.

Fig. 3. Hadoop deletion process

After an in-depth analysis of Hadoop code base and Hadoop
Filesystem, the following flow of control, as depicted in Fig. 4,
has been detected whenever any user sends a delete command
within Hadoop.
Within Hadoop binaries, multiple delete functions are
implemented which carry out file deletion, recursive directory
deletion, etc. All these functions can be specified with an option
of:
1) File being sent temporarily to the Trash directory which is
similar to the Recycle Bin in Windows.
2) File deleted without moving to Trash directory.
All these functions map down to Java and C Libraries which
further drill down to Java Native Interface (JNI) which
implements the actual unlinking of the data blocks. No changes
were done within JNI. Instead the custom secure delete function
is placed within the first layer of functions from where the call
for file/directory deletion is sent. The main advantage of this
approach is that it seamlessly integrates into Hadoop itself and
every file that is deleted in Hadoop will be securely deleted.

Fig. 4. Modified delete code flow

Fig. 5. Secure Deletion process

C. Node Removal
In this approach, once the spillage situation is detected, all
the data nodes on which the spilled data is stored are noted.
Other data blocks present on these nodes are documented. The
user/administrator then deletes the spilled data from unclassified
cluster via the normal deletion process. At this point of time,
Hadoop has deleted the pointers to the data and the memory
locations occupied by the data are marked as free space.
Now one of the data nodes which had spilled data is taken
offline. Hadoop’s name node, per its normal node-alive-check
operation, tries to contact this node every few seconds. In default
configuration, Hadoop declares a node “dead” in case it is not
able to contact the node for 600 seconds (10 min). When a node
is declared dead then all the data that was stored in that node is
automatically replicated to other nodes so that the number of

copies of the data are maintained in accordance with the
replication factor.

Various tests are performed on this procedure and the results of
the tests are detailed in the next section.

Once replication is complete the hard drive from the dead
node is replaced by a new hard drive. The old drive is sanitized
and securely destroyed as per NIST 800-88 guidelines [10]. The
node is brought back online with the new hard drive. Hadoop
automatically connects to it and utilizes the free space on this
node to store data in the future. Thus the data remnants from the
data node is completely destroyed. The same procedure is
performed on other data nodes which had spilled data on them,
one-by-one. Thus ensuring good data is preserved and any
spilled data remnants are securely discarded.

V. RESULTS

This approach integrates into the Containment, Eradication
and Recovery stage of the Incident Response Process as shown
in Fig. 6.

Fig. 6. Approach 3 Integration into Incident Response Process [7]

A step-by-step procedure for this approach which can be
integrated in an incident response process is as below:

The Hadoop infrastructure configuration on which the tests
were performed is as given below in Table 1.
Table 1 Hadoop Cluster Configuration

Parameters

Value

Name Node

1

Data Node

7

OS

Ubuntu 14.04

RAM (each node)

4 GB

Disk Size (each node)

20 GB

Hadoop Version

2.7.3

Block Size

128MB

Replication Factor

3

Before getting into the results of each approach it is
necessary to prove that data remnants exist on the file system
after normal deletion. A PDF test file was normally deleted
using Hadoop’s delete command and then the file system image
was analyzed in Access Data's FTK imager to recover the
deleted blocks as shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8.

1) Data nodes containing spilled data are identified and their
system details are documented.
2) Details about the good data blocks stored in these data nodes
are documented.
3) Spilled data is deleted via the normal deletion procedure in
Hadoop.
4) One of the identified data nodes is taken offline.
5) Hadoop declares the data node as “dead” after a set interval
of time and initiates replication of the good data that was
stored in that node, into other data nodes that are online. The
good data is sourced from other data nodes on which their
copies are present. Hadoop performs the replication
automatically to maintain the number of copies of data in
accordance with the configured replication factor.
Verification of good data replication is performed vis-à-vis
the documented details in step 2.
6) Hard drive from the dead data node is replaced with a new
drive. Old drive is sanitized and securely destroyed.
7) The data node is brought back online with the new hard
drive.
8) Hadoop automatically identifies the data node and uses it to
store data in the future.
9) Repeat procedure for all data nodes identified in step 1.
The main concern for the adoption of this procedure is the
possibility of spilled data being replicated along with good data,
which, if happens, would defeat the purpose of the procedure.

Fig. 7. PDF file representation in Hex before deletion

Fig. 8. PDF file in Unallocated space after deletion

To test the approaches, multiple file types were added to
Hadoop’s cluster such as images, PDFs, text, compressed files,
etc. The results of the three approaches are as discussed below:
A. OS Level Secure Deletion
Proceeding with the same sample PDF file described in
Section 4, tests were performed with 0-fills and random fills.
File size of the tested file was 128 MB. The working of the tool
is shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. Name of the file to be overwritten
was given as the input. Once the input was provided, tool
gathered the information of data blocks residing on different
Data Nodes and then performed the overwriting procedure.
When performing overwrite 5 times with 0-fills, the tool took
around 60 seconds to complete the process. The CPU utilization
during the overwrite process was recorded to be approximately
around 40% on corresponding data nodes. Similarly, to
overwrite 5 times with random-fills, the tool took around 270
seconds. The CPU utilization during this process was
approximately around 80% on corresponding data nodes.

Fig. 10. Working of Tool – Part 2

Once the file blocks were overwritten, file was normally
deleted using Hadoop's built-in command and file image of
corresponding data nodes were analyzed using Access Data's
FTK imager. Fig. 11 shows the unallocated sectors after the
zero-fills and Fig. 12 shows the unallocated sectors after the
random-fills. The file into consideration was not found
anywhere in free space. Thereby achieving secure deletion.

Fig. 11. File representation after zero-fill

Fig. 9. Working of Tool – Part 1
Fig. 12. File representation after random-fill

The operations performed by the tool is logged in a log file
which can be used for audit trail purpose. The log file is located
in the Hadoop logs directory, under a directory named
“overwrite”. The name of the log file is “hadoop-overwrite.log”.
A sample log file would look like below:

Fig. 13. Sample log file

B. Enhancement of Hadoop Binaries
Hard link is a label or name assigned to a file. A given file
can have many names referring to the same content hence
commands executed upon any of these will operate upon the
same file contents [11]. For testing purpose hard links were
created for each data block generated for the test file placed in
Hadoop.
Below are the steps carried out to test the approach on a zip
file. FTK Imager is used to forensically analyze the disk of each
node to find out data remnants and test efficiency of the secure
deletion operation. Two is taken as the replication factor.

Fig. 15. Data blocks after

Step 3: Hadoop delete command sent to delete the zip file

Step 1: Disk Analysis of data node showing block file created in
Hadoop on FTK

Fig. 16. Secure Deletion

Fig. 16 shows that for the test file the custom script placed
as part of the patch generates additional details which indicates
that one block has been created for the file and the block name
is “blk_1073741829_1005”, block length in bytes is “243879”
and the address of the nodes where the block and its replicated
copy has been placed in Hadoop is “192.168.65.168,
192.168.65.134”. All this data is also sent to a separate log file
along with time stamp details.
Step 4: Disk Analysis of data node showing securely deleted file
accessed by Hard Link

Fig. 14. Data blocks on Data Node

Step 2: Disk Analysis of data node showing file accessed by
Hard link on FTK

Fig. 17. Secure Deletion Verification

Above figure shows that the data block has been successfully
overwritten with 0’s (in this example the dd command has been
set to overwrite the data blocks with one pass of 0’s. This
functionality can be changed according to user preference).
Since the pointer to the block has been removed by Hadoop,
hard links are used to find out the block content.
The secure deletion operation is logged with relevant details
and the log file is placed in the Hadoop logs folder. The name of
the log file is “securedelete-YYYYMMDD.log” where
YYYYMMDD represents the year, month and date of the
operation done. New log files are created for each day, thus
making it convenient for server housekeeping activities. A
sample log file is as shown below, and the highlighted area
shows the log for the tests described above.

due to its smaller size and replicated across different nodes. It is
noted that blocks 1, 4 and 7 of dbb.mp4 and block 0 of
test1_midtermprogressreport.zip are placed on a common data
node called “slave-3”.

Fig. 20. Data block of classified file.

3) The second file is deleted via Hadoop’s normal deletion
process resulting in data remnants.

Fig. 21. Deleting the classified file using Hadoop delete command.
Fig. 18. Log file

Above test results shows that the pointer to the block has
been removed and simultaneously the content has also been
overwritten hence making the data inaccessible by the forensic
tool FTK Imager, thus achieving the purpose.

4) Data remnants are verified to be present using disk image
analysis tool FTK Imager.

C. Node Removal
Since the main concern with adoption of this approach is the
possibility of spilled data being replicated along with good data,
the procedure detailed in section IV is performed on the test
environment and disk images are analyzed. Two files are used
to simulate a data spillage situation. The results are detailed
below.
1) One file named dbb.mp4 is split into 9 blocks (block 0 to
block 8) and replicated across different data nodes.

Fig. 22. Verification of presense of classified data remnants.

5) The common data node “slave-3” is taken offline.

Fig. 19. Data blocks of dbb.mp4

2) The second file named test1_ midtermprogressreport.zip,
which is considered a classified file, is stored in just one block

Fig. 23. Taking the data node offline.

6) Data blocks of dbb.mp4 from dead node are replicated. The
replicated data blocks are now stored in slave-1 and slave-2.

Fig. 26 shows a comparison of time taken for deleting files
of different sizes against the deletion method viz. normal
deletion, secure deletion via approach 1 and secure deletion via
approach 2. We can see that time taken in case of approach 1
exponentially increases with increase in file size. Time taken by
approach 2, although higher than the time taken by normal
deletion, is within acceptable limits and does not show an
exponential increase.

Performance Chart 1 - File Size v. Time
33

35

Fig. 24. Data blocks of dbb.mp4 replicated to Slave-1 and Slave-2 nodes.

7) Disk images of slave-1 and slave-2 are analyzed to find data
remnants of test1_midtermprogressreport.zip. However, the
remnants are not found on either of the data nodes.
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Fig. 26. Performance Chart 1 – File Size v. Time

Fig. 25. Disk image analysis of Slave-1 and Slave-2 data nodes.

The test shows that there is no replication of spilled data as
well as there is no replication of other data remnants that may be
previously present on data nodes.

Fig. 27 shows a comparison of CPU utilization for
deleting files of different sizes against the deletion method viz.
normal deletion, secure deletion via approach 1 and secure
deletion via approach 2. We can see that CPU utilization in case
of approach 1 rapidly increases with increase in file size. CPU
utilization by approach 2, although higher than that of normal
deletion, is within acceptable limits and does not show an
exponential increase.

The above procedure offers the highest degree of security in
terms of eliminating risk to confidentiality of data due to
spillage, but becomes cost intensive for large scale production
systems.

VI.

PERFORMANCE TESTING

Performance of first and second approach was tested for a
variety of file types and sizes and a comparison has been drawn
as shown in the below charts. Hadoop treats all types of files as
binary data and hence as expected, it was observed that the type
of the file had no impact on the performance, only the size of the
file influenced the performance. Hence the comparison charts
are based on size and not on file types. Since the third approach
is procedural it’s performance evaluation cannot be made.

42%

45%
40%

% CPU Utilization

All three approaches have been tested with different file
types like PDF, JPG, MP4, TXT, ZIP, DOCX, PPTX and
XLSX. The results shown in this section collectively represents
the results of all the tests conducted.

Performance Chart 2 - Size v. CPU
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Fig. 27. Performance Chart 2 – File Size v. CPU Utilization

VII.

DISCUSSION

Section V details the results of tests conducted on all three
approaches. The results for the first and second approaches look
satisfactory. In both approaches the spilled data can be
overwritten in two different ways, zero-fills and random-fills.
The representation of the memory locations occupied by the file
before and after the fills are presented. It is seen that after zero
fill or random fill, the memory locations are in fact overwritten
and their hex representation has changed (as shown in Fig. 11
and Fig. 12). Any attempts to recover original data would not be
successful.
This shows that both approach work and satisfy the intended
purpose. However, there is a performance issue in the first
approach since the CPU utilization shoots to above 40%, which
is an overhead on production systems where multiple
applications run in parallel. Hence it is recommended to perform
the secure deletion operation during off-peak hours. This
becomes a constraint in adoption of first approach. Further work
may be done in this direction to implement multi-threading for
overwriting functionality which would reduce the performance
impact.
The second approach does not pose significant performance
issues and is by far the most convenient to implement and use.
It integrates seamlessly with Hadoop and performs secure
deletion for every file that is deleted. The only concern with
respect to security in this approach is that the script which
implements secure deletion functionality is written in bash,
which is a human readable format. The source code can be read
and manipulated with relevant privileges. Further work can be
done in this approach to develop java code to implement the
secure deletion functionality. This would make the entire
solution completely integrated within Hadoop without any
security concerns.
Another area in which further work can be done is to address
unusual situations like partial node failure, network failure
causing loss of connectivity to a data node, partial power failure
etc. before secure deletion of spilled data is performed. In such
situations the secure deletion code would need to be able to
identify once disconnected or partially failed nodes are
recovered, and then perform secure deletion on them. It would
also need to take care of any replication performed by Hadoop
to maintain the “replication factor” number of copies of data.
Overwriting of data multiple times on magnetic memory
drives, as performed in the first two approaches, have an
inherent natural drawback knows as magnetic remanence [4].
Magnetic remanence is the residual magnetism on magnetic
hard drives due to which data can be retrieved even after being
overwritten. It is a much debated topic in the research
community with articles published both for and against data
retrieval techniques based on magnetic remanence. There have
been evidences of data being recovered even after the memory
blocks being overwritten a couple of times. In sensitive
environments the required degree of security in a data deletion
process is extremely high. In such environments the third
approach would be more suited if cost is not a constraint.
The main drawbacks of the third approach are the feasibility
and scalability aspects of the approach. Since it involves a

downtime on some data nodes, it requires communication and
co-ordination between different teams which are affected, such
as data center management team, server administration team,
application maintenance team etc. It also requires highly skilled
labor to perform replacement, sanitization and secure
destruction of hard drives. Further work can be done towards
having stand by systems to replace affected data nodes in order
to mitigate any impact on normal operations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Data Spillage possess a great risk to confidentiality of data
and has to be dealt with efficiently. Secure deletion is a key
factor in containing the spilled data. As shown in this paper,
deleted data can be recovered from the image of file systems
using forensic tools. Occurrence of such situations in
government agencies could lead to impact on national security.
Hence this problem qualifies for extensive research with an aim
to prevent data leakage in spillage situations.
In this direction, this paper proposed and evaluated three
approaches of tackling spillage situation with an aim to arrive at
the optimal one. This would lead to the development of a formal
solution which is implementable on large scale production
systems.
The first approach implements secure deletion process at the
OS level by overwriting the data blocks of the file to be deleted
multiple times with zero or random fills. This makes it almost
impossible to retrieve spilled data from file systems using
forensic tools. In second approach, Hadoop binaries are
modified to incorporate secure deletion functionality. So when
a user deletes any data, data blocks that are to be deleted are
overwritten with zero or random bits and then the pointers to the
data blocks are deleted, thereby ensuring secure data deletion. In
the final approach, the data nodes that have data remnants, are
removed from the clusters one-by-one, allowing enough time for
good data to replicate. The hard drives of the affected node are
replaced with fresh ones and the old drives are securely
destroyed. This ensures that the spilled data is not retrievable
anymore.
Testing of the all the three approaches show successful
deletion of data remnants thus satisfying the intended purpose.
Comparison of all the three approaches based on various
parameters is as shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Evaluation of the three approaches

Parameter
Effort
Feasibility
Degree of
Security
Performance
Impact
Downtime
Required
Scalability

OS Level
Secure
Deletion
Medium
High

Enhancement
of Hadoop
Binaries
High
High

Medium

Medium

High

High

Low

N/A

No

No

Yes

Medium

High

Low

Node
Removal
High
Low

Ease of use
Flexibility
Dependency
on Trained
Personnel
Degree of
Achievable
Automation

Medium
High

High
High

Low
Low

Medium

Low

High

Medium

High

Low

From the above comparison, the second approach of
Enhancement of Hadoop Binaries stands out to be most optimal
and feasible solution to be deployed in any existing Hadoop
cluster environment to address data spillage issues.
However, it is important to note that the first and third
approaches do have a scope for implementation as well. In large
scale systems where the administrator desires to have block level
overwriting control over the data stored on the systems, the tool
developed in OS level secure deletion approach is very useful.
The tool must be used with due caution and relevant access
controls need to be in place to govern the usage of the tool. In
extremely security sensitive environments such as government
agencies the procedure detailed in the node removal approach
can be implemented to achieve the highest degree of security in
remediating data spillage situations.
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